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1 Introduction 
Deschouwer and Van Parijs (2009) argue that the political philosophy underlying their 
proposal for a federal electoral district in Belgium (known as the Pavia Group proposal) is 
based on the belief that intelligent institutional engineering can provide concrete solutions for 
linguistically heterogeneous polities such as Belgium or the European Union. 
 
The proposal consists of creating a single federal electoral district in Belgium, from which 15 
of the 150 federal parliamentarians would be elected according to a proportional 
representation (PR) formula. Every citizen, thus, could cast two votes: one within his/her 
electoral district (as today), and one within the single federal district. The system of open 
party lists would allow citizens to vote not only for a party but also for single candidates from 
the same party list. Its authors hope that this proposal would provide incentives to politicians 
and the media to cross linguistic boundaries. For their part, voters would have an incentive to 
vote for candidates from a language group other than their own. 
 
                                                 
1 An earlier (and much shorter) version of this paper was published last year. In particular, it does not 
include Section 3 and the second part of Section 4 of the present paper. See Stojanovic, Nenad. 2011. “A federal 
electoral district for Belgium? An appraisal with three amendments inspired by the Swiss experience”, in Axel 
Gosseries and Yannick Vanderborght (eds.), Arguing About Justice. Essays for Philippe Van Parijs. Louvain: 
Presses Universitaires de Louvain, pp. 327-336. If you wish to quote this paper please do refer to this published 
version (available on request).  
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If implemented, this proposal would clearly move Belgium away from the present 
consociational model (Lijphart 2004), and towards the logic of the so-called “integrative 
school” (Horowitz 2002). 
 
In this paper, I will first (Section 2) briefly evaluate the Pavia Group proposal by drawing 
attention to two of the disadvantages one of its features, the reserved seats for language 
groups: the legitimacy problem and the problem of non-territorial quotas. I will then (Section 
3) illustrate this problem by discussing two examples from Switzerland in which a single 
electoral district has been either implemented or envisaged. In Section 4 I will explore the 
advantages and disadvantages of PR v. majoritarian electoral systems. Finally (Section 5), I 
will propose three amendments to the Pavia Group proposal.  
 
2 Two problems related to reserved seats 
At least one element of the Pavia Group proposal should draw our attention and rouse our 
scepticism: the use of a linguistic quota (i.e., reserved seats) in the federal electoral district 
that fixes in advance the number of seats for Dutch speakers (nine) and for French speakers 
(six).2  
 
First, such quotas are problematic for the stability of democracy in divided societies. If they 
are too rigid, with permanently defined proportions, they are difficult to amend even if 
circumstances (e.g., demographics) demand it (e.g., Lebanon). Moreover, they can undermine 
the overall legitimacy of the political system if the citizen-electors of one group can influence, 
in a considerable way, who occupies the seats reserved for another (often rival) group. I will 
call this the legitimacy problem.3 
 
Second, group rights such as quotas based on non-territorial identity markers (language, 
ethnicity, religion, etc.) are problematic for a liberal democracy based on individual rights 
attributed on the basis of territorially-linked citizenship and of membership in non-territorially 
                                                 
2 Deschouwer and Van Parijs (2009: 16) defend the quotas with the following argument: “In the absence 
of quota, there is a risk – indeed a certainty in the foreseeable future – that many voters will be reluctant to 
support a politician from the other language group for fear of contributing to a reduction in the representation of 
their own group in Parliament.”  
3 In the context of Belgium, the quota provision envisaged by the Pavia Group proposal might weaken the 
impact on politicians' behavior that its advocates desire. The reason is simple: Flemish-speaking citizens might 
elect French-speaking candidate A in spite of the fact that he/she enjoys less support in his/her home region (say 
Wallonia) than candidate B, also a French speaker from Wallonia. This voting behavior, if repeated over time, 
could undermine the overall legitimacy of the federal electoral district. In fact, it does not seem logical that 
citizens from all over the country can cast votes for any party list and any candidate from that party list but that, 
potentially, French speakers alone could decide who will occupy the Flemish quota, and vice versa. 
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defined groups. Therefore, as a general rule, such quotas should be avoided in free and 
democratic liberal societies (see Stojanovic 2008; Rehfeld 2010). I will call this the problem 
of non-territorial quotas. 
 
Let me illustrate the two problems related to quotas by taking two examples from 
Switzerland. The first example deals with the legitimacy problem. The second demonstrates 
both the legitimacy and the non-territorial quota problems. 
 
 2.1 The reserved seat for French speakers in the government of the canton of Berne 
The canton of Berne is the second largest Swiss canton, both in terms of territory and 
population. Its two official languages are German and French. Yet French is the sole official 
language of the region of Jura bernois (hereafter JB), both languages are official in the 
municipality of Biel/Bienne, and the sole official language in the rest of the canton is German. 
 
French speakers are in a minority position, both numerically and politically (72’400 or 7.6%, 
including non Swiss citizens). 56% of Berne’s French speakers live in JB.4 
 
The government of the canton of Berne is composed of seven representatives. It is elected 
every four years in a majoritarian electoral system with two turns. There is only one electoral 
district and it corresponds to the cantonal territory. A special constitutional and legal 
provision, adopted after the separation of the northern part of Jura in 1979, guarantees one 
seat to the French-speaking minority of JB.5 This provision worked fine in the 1982 election 
but as early as 1986 a significant problem had arisen.  A well-known politician from JB and 
member of the federal parliament, Geneviève Aubry, was defeated in the second run by the 
relatively-unknown Benjamin Hofstetter by a margin of 7’680 votes. But his election was 
contested by some Jurassiens on the grounds that Ms. Aubry had carried JB by a margin of 
3’508 votes. On the eve of the second run, the president of the main JB party in one of the 
Jura districts declared that “JB will never accept Benjamin Hofstetter as its representative in 
the government,”6 while Ms. Aubry dismissed him a “political Nobody”7. Moreover, 
Hofstetter was a bilingual French/German of Swiss-German origin8 and some Jurassiens did 
                                                 
4 According to the 2000 census, 79% of the 51’504 citizens of JB were French speakers. 
5 This provision is neither a fully non-territorial linguistic quota (it does not include all French speakers 
living in the canton of Berne), nor a fully territorial quota (it is restricted only to French speakers from JB). 
6 SDA-ATS, 3 April 1986. 
7 Der Bund, 7 May 1986. 
8 Berner Zeitung, 12 May 1986. 
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not consider him a “true” representative of JB. In the aftermath of the election, the Free 
Democrats from the Canton of Berne, the main losers of the elections, declared their “regret” 
that the “desire of JB was over voted by the old [i.e., German-speaking] part of the canton”.9  
 
Table 1. The 1986 cantonal election in Berne. Results of the two candidates from Jura bernois 
 
 Canton of Berne JB 
Aubry 1st run:  59 436
2nd run: 60 394
1st run:  6736
2nd run: 7339
Hofstetter 1st run:  40 154
2nd run:  68 074
→ elected
1st run:  1941
2nd run:  3831
   Source: NZZ, 12 May 1986. Der Bund 26 November 2001. 
 
Recognizing the dilemma of what I term the legitimacy problem – a quota filled by a person 
who could be considered a legitimate representative of the group he is meant to represent – 
cantonal authorities sought a mechanism that would prevent similar situations (and further 
frustrations of the French-speaking minority) in the future. They wanted to limit the risk that 
the canton’s German-speaking majority could overpower the will of a majority of JB’s 
inhabitants to elect its representative. The solution was the geometric mean. It works as 
follows: for every candidate from JB, the number of votes obtained in that region is multiplied 
by the number of votes received in the whole canton (including JB); the geometric mean is the 
result of the square root of that multiplication. The reserved seat is filled by the candidate 
from JB with the highest geometric mean. In other words, this solution gives more weight, but 
not exclusive weight, to the voters of JB in the selection of their representative. The following 
table illustrates the mechanism.10 
 
 Table 2. Geometric mean 
Candidate Canton Berne (B) JB (J) Geometric mean √(BxJ) 
X 70 000 10 000 26 458
                                                 
9 Der Bund, 15 May 1986. 
10 For further examples on the functioning and possible applications of the geometric mean (particularly 
for the election of the three-member presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina), see Bochsler (2012), Hodzic and 
Stojanovic (2011). 
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Y 120 000 6 000 26 833
Z 150 000 4 000 24 495
 
Under the previous law, candidate Z would be elected since her two rival candidates (X and 
Y) received fewer votes at the level of the canton. With the new system, however, candidate Y 
would be elected, because he obtained the highest geometric mean. Candidate X would not be 
elected, even though he obtained most votes within JB; the instrument of the geometric mean 
does not throw the choice of their representative to a majority of Jura’s citizens alone. Rather, 
the representative of JB is still elected at the cantonal level but the votes she receives in JB are 
“heavier”. This also means that the French-speaking candidates have an incentive to gather 
support across linguistic borders and not only in their home region. The same, of course, 
applies to German-speaking candidates, who have an incentive to seek votes from French 
speakers. That would not have been the case if other possible solutions had been adopted, 
such as the creation of a separate electoral district for JB. 
 
If this mechanism had existed in the 1986 election, Ms. Aubry would have been elected 
(geometric mean: 21’053) instead of Mr. Hofstetter (geometric mean: 16’149). The legitimacy 
problem would not have emerged. 
 
2.2 The proposal for electing the Swiss federal government by popular vote 
Another way to solve the legitimacy problem and the non-territorial quota problem is 
illustrated by a recent proposal of the Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC). In the late 2000s, this 
party collected more than 100'000 signatures demanding, via a popular initiative, that the 
seven-member federal government be elected by the citizens in a majoritarian electoral 
system. (Today, the government is elected by the federal parliament.) Their main argument is 
that the people should directly elect their representatives in the federal executive branch, as 
they do in all Swiss cantons and in most municipalities.11 The Swiss will have the opportunity 
to vote on this proposal, probably in 2012/2013. 
 
In the context of our discussion, what is interesting is that the election of the government 
would take place within a single federal electoral district. Therefore, for our purposes, it is 
similar to the Pavia Group proposal, even though its objective is not to provide incentives for 
                                                 
11 See www.election-populaire.ch/arguments.html. Accessed 15 February 2011. 
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politicians to campaign across linguistic borders12 but rather to have a government that better 
reflects the popular support for various political parties.13  
 
However, one possible disadvantage of this proposal is that it might endanger the presence of 
linguistic minority groups (French and Italian speakers) in the government, since the first 
language of around 70% of the Swiss electorate is German (and/or a Swiss German dialect). 
Realistically, how can a French or Italian speaker, with a good knowledge of German but no 
fluency in Swiss German, run an electoral campaign in the German-speaking regions of 
Switzerland and have a fair chance of being elected? The authors of the SVP/UDC proposal 
anticipated that critique and, they include a quota for French and Italian speakers: at least two 
of the seven seats shall be reserved for them.  
 
However, unlike the Pavia Group proposal, this is not really a non-territorial linguistic quota. 
Rather, it is a territorial quota that indirectly and implicitly ensures a representation for 
French and Italian speakers. It states that at least two of the seven elected members of 
government must have their residence in the French or Italian speaking areas of Switzerland. 
In other words, nothing prevents a German speaker who lives, for example, in the Italian-
speaking canton Ticino to run for the government and to profit from this provision in spite of 
the fact that her mother tongue is neither French nor Italian.14  This quota thus remains 
compatible with liberal democratic principles and avoids the problem of non-territorial quotas 
discussed above. 
 
This does not address the legitimacy problem, however: citizens from German-speaking areas 
of Switzerland, by virtue of their numerical majority, could determine who fills the seats that 
are supposed to represent the French and Italian-speaking areas in the government. For this 
reason the proposal contains the rule of geometric mean, imitating the model applied in the 
canton of Berne. For the two seats reserved for French and Italian-speaking areas, the votes of 
their citizens will have more weight than the votes of the citizens in German-speaking areas. 
 
                                                 
12 Indeed, its advocates are probably unaware of this possible effect, which is not mentioned whatsoever 
on their official website (see footnote above). 
13 In fact, although the SVP/UDC received some 30% of the votes in the 2007 parliamentary election, it 
has only one representative in the government. The Liberal-Radical party, on the other hand, has two 
representatives but only 15% of the parliamentary seats.   
14 This problem is potential but not actual. Informal conventions and political pressure will certainly 
prevent any major federal party from running German-speaking candidates with residence in French or Italian-
speaking cantons, unless these candidates are truly rooted in those cantons and speak the local language fluently. 
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3 PR or majoritarian electoral system? 
The Pavia Group proposal is based on the open-list PR electoral system. This means that the 
voters are free to vote not only for parties, but also for single candidates within a given party 
list. (A free-list PR, in use in Luxembourg and in Switzerland, would allow, in addition, to 
vote for candidates from different party lists.) 
 
The PR electoral system is embedded in the consociational model of democracy (Lijphart 
2004). In Belgium it is even written down in the constitution (art. 62). 
 
Nevertheless, I believe that in order to meet the objectives of the Pavia Group a form of 
majoritarian system would do a better job.  
 
Indeed, PR systems present various drawbacks: they encourage the creation of ethnic parties, 
they provide incentives for radical instead of moderate political discourse, they oblige the 
parties to form coalitions after the elections and not before the elections, etc. Here I would 
like to underline one particular aspect that is worth exploring: the impact of the electoral 
system on the inter-ethnic v. intraethnic voting behaviour of the citizens. 
 
Indeed, my observations rejoin Horowitz’ comments on the Pavia Group proposal: 
 
“There is, however, one function list PR typically does not perform, and that is providing 
incentives to bridge ethnic divisions. List PR is known as a centrifugal system (Cox 1990), 
and it is more appropriate for assuring descriptive ethnic representation than for fostering 
interethnic accommodation. What the Pavia Group proposals do by providing a federal 
electoral constituency is simply to add 15 seats elected from a heterogeneous constituency, 
but it is difficult to see how this would modify the ethnic-voting incentives of either 
candidates or voters.” (Horowitz 2009: 27). 
 
So an important concern for Horowitz is to design an electoral system that encourages inter-
ethnic, or inter-communitarian, vote instead of intraethnic or intracommunitarian vote. The 
idea, here, is that a vigorous representative democracy requires that the citizens vote 
considering public good and well-being of the society as a whole and not exclusively specific 
and narrow interests of ascriptive communities to which they belong. And this implies that 
they vote not only for candidates from their own ethnic/linguistic/religious community (intra-
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ethnic or intra-communitarian vote) but also for candidates who come from other 
communities (inter-ethnic or inter-communitarian vote). Thus, the inter-communitarian vote is 
considered as positive for democracy, cohesion and social integration of a polity.15 Horowitz’ 
thesis is that majoritarian systems provide more incentives for inter-communitarian voting, 
whereas PR favours ethnic voting. 
 
I agree and, in the next section, I will illustrate this point by presenting an example from 
Switzerland. 
 
3.1 Example of PR v. majoritarian elections in Valais 
After the separation of the northern Jura from the canton of Berne, in the 1970s, Valais can be 
considered as the Swiss canton in which the linguistic cleavage between the French-speaking 
majority and the German-speaking minority is particularly most pronounced (see Keech 
1972). The cantonal constitutions partition its territory into three administrative regions: Bas-
Valais, Valais central and Oberwallis. Bas-Valais and Valais central are predominantly French-
speaking and are often referred to as “Valais romand”. Oberwallis is German-speaking. 
Linguistic homogeneity within the linguistic regions is very strong (see Table 3).  This makes 
Valais the best candidate for exploring the impact of PR vs. majoritarian vote on the electoral 
behaviour.16  
 
Table 3. Regional distribution of the linguistic groups, Valais, 2000 (%) 
 Valais romand Oberwallis Total 
French speakers 94.2 1.2 66.3 
German speakers 4.4 97.9 32.5 
Other  1.4 0.9 1.2 
Note: Swiss citizens only. Valais romand is composed of the constitutional regions of 
Bas-Valais and Valais central. 
Source: Statistical Office of the Canton of Valais. 
 
                                                 
15  Horowitz’ approach has been labelled “integrative” or “centripetal” in opposition to Lijphart’s 
“consociational” model. 
16  Another interesting exploration of Horowitz vs. Lijphart debate is related to the alleged importance of 
PR for adequate institutional representation of all main segments of a society. Yet it can be argued that when 
groups are territorially concentrated – as it is the case of linguistic groups in Switzerland – adequate 
parliamentary representation is ensured through electoral districts and does not depend on PR or majoritarian 
methods per se (Stojanovic 2006). And in the cases in which territorial solutions cannot be used – for example in 
the elections of the cantonal governments in the multilingual cantons – majoritarian systems often achieve better 
results than PR (Stojanovic 2008). 
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As we have seen, one of Horowitz’ concerns is to design an electoral system which does not 
encourage the formation of ethnic and/or extremist parties but, instead, promotes multiethnic 
and/or moderate parties. His argument is that majoritarian systems are better suited to do the 
job, whereas PR does exactly the opposite. For this reason I propose to look, first, at the 
effects of PR vs. majoritarian system on the number of political parties in Valais. I will then 
proceed with an analysis of the impact of electoral systems on the inter-communitarian vote. 
 
Table 4 displays the party system of the canton of Valais. We can notice that there are two 
main cleavages: ideological and linguistic. There are no proper “ethnic” or “ethnolinguistic” 
parties, that is, parties which primary objective is to defend the interests of the respective 
ethnolinguistic community (see Vlaams Belang in Flanders or Südtiroler Volkspartei in the 
Italian region of Südtirol / Alto Adige). Still, the linguistic cleavage is also evident since every 
party family based on the ideological cleavage – with the notable exception of the Green party 
– is split along linguistic lines. Christian Democrats – who always held the absolute majority 
of Valais’ seats in all political institutions (including the mandates in the two houses of the 
federal parliament)17 – are further split according to their internal political cleavage (Social 
vs. Conservative).18  
 
Table 4. Party system in the canton of Valais 
Party family Valais romand Oberwallis 
 
Christian 
Democrats 
 
Parti Démocrate Chrétien du Valais 
romand (PDC Vr) 
 
Parti Chrétien-Social du Valais romand 
(PCS) 
 
 
Christlichdemokratischevolkspartei 
Oberwallis (CVPO) 
 
Christlichsoziale Volkspartei 
Oberwallis (CSPO) 
Liberals 
(Free Democrats) 
Parti Radical Démocratique  Valaisan 
(PRDVS) 
Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei 
Oberwallis (FDPO) 
 
Nationalists 
Conservatives 
Union démocratique du centre du 
Valais romand (UDCVR) 
 
Schweizerische Volkspartei 
Oberwallis (SVPO) 
                                                 
17  In the 2001 cantonal elections, however, for the first time they lost the absolute majority of the seats in 
the cantonal parliament. 
18  Ideological differences within Christian Democrats are so strong to the point in the 2003 federal 
elections the CSPO did not figure under the apparentement with the PDC Vr and the CVPO. The PCS even 
figured both in 2003 and 2007 under the apparentement with the Social Democrats and the Green party. 
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Social Democrats Parti Socialiste du Valais Romand 
(PSVR) 
 
Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Oberwallis (SPO) 
Green Les Verts / Die Grünen 
 
Note: CVPO, PDC Vr and CSPO are independent sections of the Swiss Christian-democratic Party 
(PDC/CVP). PCS is a section of the Swiss Christian-social Party (PCS/CSP). PSVR and SPO are 
sections of the Swiss Social-democratic Party (PS/SP). PRDVS and FDPO are sections of the Swiss 
Free Democrats (PRD/FDP). UDCVR and SVPO are sections of the Swiss People’s Party (UDC/SVP). 
Les Verts / Die Grünen is a section of the Swiss Green party. 
 
The party system in Valais confirms Horowitz’ thesis that PR encourages the multiplication of 
party-lists on the basis of the linguistic cleavage. In fact, in the 2003 elections to the National 
Council only the Green party and the Young Socialists presented bilingual party-lists. All 
other party-lists were monolingual. In the 2007 only the Green party had a bilingual party-list, 
since even the Young Socialists presented two monolingual party-lists. We can also notice that 
within Valais romand some parties – PRD and UDC – are further split at the sub-regional 
level. On the other hand, in the elections to the Council of States (2nd chamber of the federal 
parliament) ideological cleavages prevailed so that every party family presented either 
bilingual lists with two candidates (PDC, PS in 2003, UDC in 2007) or one candidate for both 
linguistic regions (PRD, UDC in 2003). This, again, confirms Horowitz’ thesis on the 
incentives that a majoritarian system provides for the formation of multiethnic – or, in our 
case, multilingual – parties and/or party coalitions. 
 
Why this happens? The majoritarian system, such as applied in the two-member elections of 
the Council of States or in the multimember elections of the cantonal governments, increases 
the power of party elites. They are obliged to opt for a minimal number of candidates which 
corresponds to the maximum number of seats that they judge realistic to gain according to 
their approximate electoral share. They have no incentives to propose more candidates – even 
if the electoral law allows them to do so – because this would increase the dispersion of the 
votes of their voters, profit the candidates of other parties and, therefore, undermine the 
chances of their candidates to get elected. So in multilingual cantons like Valais parties that 
wish to gain seats in the Council of States (or in the cantonal government) have an 
institutional incentive to choose candidates from different linguistic groups in order to attract 
votes from all linguistic communities. 
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It shall be noted that the elections to the National Council (1st chamber of the federal 
parliament) are held under a very peculiar PR system. It is a free list (panachage) system that 
allows the parties to join their lists under a single party-coalition or apparentement. This is a 
further incentive for the parties to create two or more party-lists in order to attract more votes. 
For this reason it could be argued that a PR system without the possibility of apparentement (a 
closed list PR, for instance) would not have produced the same effects as far as the number of 
parties is concerned. Moreover, the low district magnitude (Valais has only seven seats in the 
National Council) would have probably obliged the parties belonging to the same ideological 
family to join their forces in order to gain more mandates. 
 
Now, what is extent of the inter-communitarian vote in Valais in the elections to the two 
houses of the federal parliament? Table 5 shows, first, the similarities and the differences 
between these two elections. 
 
Table 5. Similarities and differences in the comparison of the elections to the Council of States 
and the National Council in the canton of Valais 
 Council of States National Council 
Similarities    
Political system Valais Valais 
Electoral district 1 (canton) 1 (canton) 
Day of the election  X (1st round) and Y (2nd round) X 
Effective voters* V V 
Number of party-coalitions  4-5 4-5 (apparentements) 
   
Differences   
Electoral system Majoritarian PR 
District magnitude 2 7 
Number of party-lists 4-5 15-30 
Number of candidates 7-10 > 90 
Number of votes pro voter 0-2 0-7 
Note: (*) The electoral lists for the two elections may slightly differ because they are regulated by different 
electoral laws (Council of States: cantonal law; National Council: federal law). 
 
I define the inter-communitarian vote in the following way: It takes place when a voter of the 
language community A casts a vote for a candidate of the language community B. 
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Table 6: Inter-communitarian vote in Valais, federal elections, 2003 and 2007 
Electoral system Majoritarian PR 
Election Council of States Council of States National Council National Council 
Year 
 
2003 2007 2003 2007 
ICV Valais romand 67.0 64.0 14.0 3.4 
ICV Oberwallis 45.3 46.6 15.8 13.8 
ICV total 51.5 54.1 15.5 10.8 
ICV total* 58.2 57.6 2.4 2.8 
ICV total (mean) 52.8 13.2 
ICV total* (mean) 57.9   2.6 
Note: (*) adjusted results. 
 
The results displayed in Table 6 show that Horowitz’ hypothesis holds. Under majoritarian 
system the citizens are more inclined to vote for candidates from another linguistic 
community. Approximately one out of two citizens voted for candidates from another 
linguistic community under majoritarian system (52.8%), whereas only one out of eight did so 
in PR elections (13.2%). The adjusted results show an even stronger contrast. The inter-
communitarian vote in the elections to the Council of States rises to 57.9%, whereas it drops 
significantly in the elections to the National Council (2.6%). And if we were able to take fully 
into account the “minority voter effect” we would probably see a further decrease of the ICV 
in both elections. This would affect, however, much more significantly the figures concerning 
the elections to the National Council since the percentage of the inter-communitarian vote in 
the elections to the Council of States would hardly go below 50%. 
 
4 Implications for the Pavia Group proposal? Three amendments 
The Swiss examples illustrated in the previous section lead me to propose the following 
amendments to the Pavia Group proposal. First, ensure the linguistic balance through 
territorial instead of linguistic non-territorial quotas. Second, apply the geometric mean. 
Third, use a majoritarian system instead of open list PR. 
 
Here are the main features of the amended proposal. 
 
a. 15 of the 150 seats in the federal parliament represent a single federal electoral district 
(Belgium). [This is the very core of the Pavia Group proposal.] 
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b. Every citizen has a maximum of 5 preferential votes to assign to individual candidates. This 
gives him a genuine opportunity to influence the election of his preferred candidates. [Apart 
from that, he has another vote for one of the party lists – or some of the candidates featured on 
one of the lists – presented in a provincial electoral district. See Deschouwer and Van Parijs 
(2009: 14).] 
 
c. Only a given number of candidates are elected to the parliament from each of the following 
three regions:  
 
Flanders: (population ca. 6.3 mio). 9 seats 
Wallonia (poulation ca. 3.5 mio): 5 seats 
Brussels (population ca. 1.3 mio): 2 seats 
 
If we were to stop at these three points, the proposal would enable the citizens of the Flemish 
region to elect a candidate from the Walloon region, and vice versa, and/or it would enable the 
most numerous linguistic group (the Flemish) to elect a candidate from the Brussels region, 
etc. This legitimacy problem, however, is addressed by (d):  
 
d. Candidates with the highest geometric mean are elected, according to the following 
formula:  
 
 A: number of votes received in the Flemish region  
 B: number of votes received in the Walloon region 
 C: number of votes received in the Brussels region 
 D: number of votes received in the entire country (=A+B+C) 
 
In order to fill this regional quota the following formula will be used: 
 9 representatives from Flanders: √A*D 
 5 representatives from Wallonia: √B*D 
 2 representatives from Brussels: √C*D 
 
In my view, the Pavia Group proposal, so amended, would have the following important 
advantages over the current system:  
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The two main linguistic groups, given their relative concentration in the regions A (Dutch 
speakers), B (French speakers) and C (mostly French speakers, with a minority of Dutch 
speakers), would have, de facto, a fair chance to be represented in the parliament (within 
the group of 15 MPs elected in the federal electoral district).  
Nevertheless, the system would also be equally open to linguistic “others” (e.g., German 
speakers from Wallonia, people from immigrant origin, bilingual Dutch-French speakers 
from Brussels, etc.). 
All citizens, regardless of place of residence, would be able to vote for the candidates of their 
choice. 
Thanks to the single electoral district and the rule of geometric mean, all candidates would be 
motivated to campaign throughout the whole country – not, as is currently the case, solely 
within their own region. This would have a strong integrative effect, which would in turn 
promote inter-community cooperation and compromise. 
The use of the geometric mean would give greater weight, but not sole discretion, to the 
citizens from regions A, B and C for the election of MPs from their respective regions.  
 
Although this electoral system appears complicated from the viewpoint of voters it is 
remarkably simple: any voter can vote for any candidate, bearing in mind that they are more 
likely to influence the election of a candidate from their own region than a candidate from the 
other two regions. However, I will try to clarify the functioning of the rule of geometric mean 
with the aid of a fictitious example (albeit inspired by reality) 
 
Table 7. Election results within the federal electoral district 
 
[See Table 7 in attachment as Excel document] 
 
Here are some comments on these fictitious results: 
- Out of 25 candidates, 16 candidates are elected. 
- In spite of the nominally proportional system, the party distribution is rather balanced: 
4 Liberals, 4 Christian Democrats, 3 Socialists, 3 Ecologists, 2 Nationalists (ND&V). 
[This is a surpising but a logic outcome of the majoritarian system within large multi-
member districts. Parties (or party families) have an incentive not to present too many 
candidates. Otherwise there is a risk that their voters spread the available votes on too 
many candidates. The end effect might be that the party, or party family, receives less 
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seats than it is “entitled” to according to it real force within the electorate.] 
- In spite of the regional and not ethno-linguistic quota there is a nice balance of 
language groups: 8 Dutch speakers (50%), 6 French speakers (38%), 1 German 
speaker (6%) and 1 bilingual French/Dutch speaker (6%). 
- The results indicate that most parties made alliances with the parties of the same party 
family from the other linguistic region. The level of the inter-ethnic vote is high. 
- The geometric mean has prevented undesireble surprises. The candidate D – a Dutch-
speaking nationalist from Brussels – has obtained a large support in Flanders (1 mio 
votes) but only a small portion of votes in his own region (50’000) and, of course, 
almost no votes in Wallonia (5’000). He was not elected in spite of the fact that the 
total of his votes (1,055 mio) is higher than the total of the votes that the candidate B – 
a bilingual Ecologist – obtained at the national level (960’000). In fact, the geometric 
mean of the candidate D (229,7) is significantly lower than the one of the candidate B 
(325,0). The reason is that the candidate B obtained a much stronger support in his 
own region (110’000 votes) as well as a considerable support in both Flanders 
(450’000) and in Wallonia (400’000). 
- Nevertheless, the system does nor preclude the election of Flemish nationalists. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that two of them did get elected and that the candidate E – a 
Flemish nationalist from Flanders – almost got elected, in spite of the fact that he is at 
the end of the list (position 25) in terms of the votes collected in whole Belgium 
(410’000). His geometric mean (405,0) is only slightly lower than the one (407,9) of 
the candidate J (a Flemish Ecologist).  The reason is that the candidate J collected 
much less votes in his region (260’000) than the candidate E (400’000). Does this 
mean that French speakers decided who should occupy the Flemish seat? Not really. 
Look at the candidate O (a Flemish socialist). He received a lot of support among the 
French-speaking electorate (500’000 in Wallonia) but did poorely in his own region 
(100’000) votes. So his geometric mean is particarly low (258.8) and he did not get 
elected, even though his total number of votes is higher (670’000) than that of the 
candidate J (640’000) who eventually got elected. 
 
5 Conclusion 
In the 2000s Philippe Van Parijs dedicated a lot of time and energy to contributing to the 
solution of the Belgian political stalemate, in the finest tradition of intellectuels engagés. The 
creation of the Pavia Group (the name, by the way, stems from the place where its members 
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would gather to discuss different proposals: Philippe’s house in the Pavia street in Brussels) 
and the Re-Bel Initiative (“Rethinking Belgium”) testify to the importance of this 
involvement. The proposal for a single federal electoral district is the finest product of this 
engagement. It has not been confined to the academic community but has increasingly 
received endorsements from Belgian political leaders from both sides of the language border 
(see www.paviagroup.be). 
 
This article shall be seen as an admiring appraisal of the Pavia Group proposal. Nevertheless, 
I identified its two disadvantages related to the provision for reserved seats: (a) the legitimacy 
problem, and (b) the problem of non-territorial quotas. 
 
By drawing inspiration from the Swiss experience, I proposed two main amendments, 
suggesting that the first problem can be tackled using the formula of geometric mean in order 
to fill the seats reserved for each region, whereas the second can be solved by introducing 
territorial (instead of linguistic) quotas on the basis of the three existing regions.  They are 
complemented by a third amendment, proposing the use of a majoritarian instead of a PR 
electoral system. 
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Candidates Language Party family Candidate from Votes received in (1'000): Position as of n. Regional quota Results: Per region Per party family Per language
Brussels Flanders Wallonia Total Belgium Geometric mean Elected? of received votes (pre-determined)
(total Belgium)
L Dutch Christ-Dem Flanders 80 800 325 1205 981.8 Yes 1 F-1 Flanders: 9 Nationalists: 2 Dutch: 8 (50%)
F Dutch Christ-Dem Flanders 40 900 50 990 943.9 Yes 9 F-2 Wallonia: 5 Socialists: 3 French: 6 (38%)
Q Dutch Nationalist Flanders 5 900 5 910 905.0 Yes 12 F-3 Brussels: 2 Liberals: 4 German: 1 (6%)
U French Liberal Wallonia 150 300 640 1090 835.2 Yes 3 W-1 Chris-Dem: 4 Bilingual: 1 (6%)
S French Socialist Wallonia 100 310 600 1010 778.5 Yes 7 W-2 Green: 3
P French Liberal Flanders 150 500 500 1150 758.3 Yes 2 F-4 Total 16 16 16
K Dutch Liberal Flanders 100 550 300 950 722.8 Yes 11 F-5
T French Socialist Wallonia 70 190 600 860 718.3 Yes 13 W-3
H Dutch Nationalist Flanders 30 700 5 735 717.3 Yes 16 F-6
V French Christ-Dem Wallonia 120 400 500 1020 714.1 Yes 5 W-4
I Dutch Christ-Dem Flanders 100 500 400 1000 707.1 Yes 8 F-7
M Dutch Socialist Flanders 50 500 200 750 612.4 Yes 15 F-8
X German Green Wallonia 130 300 350 780 522.5 Yes 14 W-5
Y French Liberal Wallonia 70 200 325 595 439.7 No 20 Quota is full
J Dutch Green Flanders 120 260 260 640 407.9 Yes 18 F-9
E Dutch Nationalist Flanders 5 400 5 410 405.0 No 25 Quota is full
C French Liberal Brussels 162 500 350 1012 404.9 Yes 6 B-1
N Dutch Green Flanders 50 300 150 500 387.3 No 22 Quota is full
Z French Christ-Dem Wallonia 50 250 250 550 370.8 No 21 Quota is full
W French Green Wallonia 50 150 260 460 345.8 No 23 Quota is full
B Bilingual D-F Green Brussels 110 450 400 960 325.0 Yes 10 B-2
O Dutch Socialist Flanders 70 100 500 670 258.8 No 17 Quota is full
D Dutch Nationalist Brussels 50 1000 5 1055 229.7 No 4 Quota is full
A French Christ-Dem Brussels 80 300 250 630 224.5 No 19 Quota is full
G Arab Indipendent Flanders 80 50 300 430 146.6 No 24 Quota is full
F = Flanders 9
W = Wallonia 5
B = Brussels 2
